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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1317 
 ___________ 
 
 COUNCIL ROCK SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
 v. 
 
THOMAS BOLICK, II; THOMAS BOLICK, III, 
 
                Appellants 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05604) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 1, 2012 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: February 7, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellants Thomas Bolick II and Thomas Bolick III appeal the District 
Court’s orders dismissing their counterclaims and granting Council Rock School 
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District’s motion for judgment on the administrative record.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 This case arises primarily under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act 
(IDEA).  In January 2006, when Bolick III was in 10th grade, his father, Bolick II, asked 
the School District to consider Bolick III for special-education services.  According to 
Bolick II, Bolick III’s sister was an “A” student, while Bolick III received average 
grades.   
 In response to Bolick II’s request, Tammy Cook, a school psychologist, conducted 
a comprehensive psycho-educational evaluation of Bolick III.  Cook determined that 
Bolick III was not entitled to special-education services.   
 Bolick II was not satisfied with Cook’s assessment.  Accordingly, in January 
2007, Bolick II retained Kristen Herzel, Ph.D., to perform an independent educational 
evaluation (IEE).  Dr. Herzel reported that while Bolick III had above-average abilities in 
written expression, reading rate, and reading fluency, his reading comprehension was 
poor.  She therefore concluded that Bolick III’s “parents may wish to pursue the 
possibility of having him classified as a student with a specific learning disability 
in . . . reading comprehension.” 
 Thomas Barnes, Ph.D., a School District psychologist, reviewed Dr. Herzel’s 
report and concluded that it was insufficiently thorough and did not establish that Bolick 
III had a disability.  Thus, the School District continued to maintain that Bolick III was 
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not entitled to special-education services.   
 Bolick II then instituted an administrative action with a Special Education Hearing 
Officer.  The Hearing Officer ultimately agreed with the School District that Bolick III 
did not possess a learning disability.  However, the Hearing Officer concluded that the 
School District’s initial examination of Bolick III had been inadequate, and thus ordered 
the School District to reimburse Bolick II for the IEE.   
 The parties subsequently initiated separate appeals:  the School District challenged 
the Hearing Officer’s order as to the IEE in the District Court, while the Bolicks 
challenged the Hearing Officer’s eligibility determination in the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court.  See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing for 
concurrent jurisdiction).  The Bolicks filed counterclaims in the federal action, raising the 
same claims that they had raised in Commonwealth Court.  The District Court dismissed 
the counterclaims pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), concluding that because these claims were also pending in 
state court, abstention was warranted.  Soon thereafter, the Commonwealth Court 
affirmed the Hearing Officer’s denial of the Bolicks’ claims.  The Bolicks then argued 
that the District Court should afford res judicata effect to the Commonwealth Court’s 
decision and dismiss the School District’s complaint; the District Court rejected this 
argument.  Meanwhile, the District Court reversed the Hearing Officer, concluded that 
the School District’s initial examination had been adequate, and ruled that the Bolicks 
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were not entitled to be reimbursed for their IEE.  The Bolicks then filed a timely notice of 
appeal to this Court.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s dismissal of the Bolicks’ counterclaims, Black Horse Lane Assocs., 
L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 228 F.3d 275, 283 n.7 (3d Cir. 2000), and the Court’s refusal 
to dismiss the School District’s complaint on the basis of res judicata, Jean Alexander 
Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir. 2006).  As to the 
District Court’s conclusion that the Bolicks were not entitled to reimbursement for their 
IEE, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s conclusions of law and review 
its findings of fact for clear error.  Warren G. v. Cumberland Cnty. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 
80, 83 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 The Bolicks’ first argument is that the District Court erred in rejecting their 
contention that the School District’s claims were precluded by res judicata.  More 
specifically, the Bolicks contend that because the School District could have presented its 
claims as counterclaims in the action in the Commonwealth Court, its failure to do so has 
caused it to forfeit those claims.  See generally Jonathan H. v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., 
562 F.3d 527, 530 (3d Cir. 2009).   
 We are not persuaded by this argument.  Federal courts must give state-court 
judgments the same preclusive effect they would have in state court.  Parsons Steel, Inc. 
v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 519 (1986).  Section 22 of the Restatement (Second) of 
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Judgments, which Pennsylvania courts have applied, see Del Turco v. Peoples Home Sav. 
Ass’n, 478 A.2d 456, 463 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), provides that when a defendant may 
present a claim as a counterclaim but fails to do so, the defendant is precluded from 
maintaining an action based on that claim if (1) “[t]he counterclaim is required to be 
interposed by a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule of court”; or (2) “[t]he 
relationship between the counterclaim and the plaintiff’s claim is such that successful 
prosecution of the second action would nullify the initial judgment or would impair rights 
established in the initial action.”  Neither requirement is satisfied here.  First, under 
Pennsylvania law, counterclaims are permissive, not compulsory, see Pa. R. Civ. P. 1148, 
and in any event, the Commonwealth Court treats challenges to decisions of Hearing 
Officers as governed by the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provide 
no mechanism for asserting counterclaims, see Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist. v. 
Jackson, 615 A.2d 910, 915 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).  Second, the School District’s claim 
and the Bolicks’ claims are entirely independent, and a judgment in the School District’s 
favor in this action will not undermine the Commonwealth Court’s judgment.  
Accordingly, we conclude that the School District’s claims are not barred by res 
judicata.
1
   
 The Bolicks next argue that the District Court erred in dismissing their 
counterclaims pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine.  We recognize, as the Bolicks 
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 The Bolicks occasionally frame this argument as one of mootness, but we are convinced 
that, in essence, they are relying on principles of res judicata.   
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emphasize, that federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation to exercise the 
jurisdiction given them,” and that “[a]bstention, therefore, is the exception rather than the 
rule.”  Raritan Baykeeper v. NL Indus., 660 F.3d 686, 691 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal 
quotation marks, alteration omitted).  Nevertheless, even if the Bolicks are correct that 
the District Court should not have abstained here, they are entitled to no relief.  The 
Commonwealth Court has rendered a final judgment in which it rejected these very 
claims; as a consequence, even if the District Court should not have abstained, the claims 
are now barred by res judicata.  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. 
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (holding that abstention order would be “effectively 
unreviewable” if not appealed immediately because “[o]nce the state court decided the 
issue . . ., the federal court would be bound to honor that determination as res judicata”).  
Accordingly, for the Bolicks to have obtained review of the District Court’s order, it was 
incumbent upon them to file an immediate appeal.  See Spring City Corp. v. Am. Bldgs. 
Co., 193 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 1999).   
 Finally, the Bolicks claim that the District Court erred in reversing the Hearing 
Officer’s decision that they were entitled to be reimbursed for their IEE.  However, their 
argument rests on a misunderstanding of the law.  While they contend that “[a] parent has 
the right to an independent educational evaluation at public expense if the parent 
disagrees with an evaluation obtained by the public agency,” this statement captures just 
part of the law — in cases like this one, where there was an administrative hearing, the 
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School District need not reimburse the parent if it can show that its examination was 
“appropriate.”  See Warren G., 190 F.3d at 87; 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2).  The District 
Court concluded that the School District’s initial examination was, in fact, appropriate, 
and the Bolicks have failed to raise an argument challenging that ruling.  Therefore, the 
Bolicks are entitled to no relief on this claim.  See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-
CIO v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994).
2
   
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
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 To the extent that the Bolicks appeal the District Court’s denial of their motion for 
reconsideration, we will affirm the District Court.  The Bolicks’ motion for 
reconsideration merely reasserts arguments that the District Court properly rejected, and 
therefore plainly lacks merit.  See Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 
1985) (purpose of motion for reconsideration is to correct manifest errors of law or fact 
or to present newly discovered evidence). 
